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Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac 24720 28.07.2010

Srebrenica

Author: Mr. Darko Trifunovic, M. S. L.
Editor & translator: Ms. Jill Starr
Art director: Mr. Milosh Zorica
Publisher: LPC Yugoslavia


14. Tragična istorija Srba iz Srebrenice

Srebrenica ima potresnu istoriju za Srbe, posebno u toku Drugog svjedskog rata, koja se može sagledati i kroz pad srpske populacije u Srebrenici. Prije Drugog svjetskog rata Srbi su činili 50. 6% a muslimani 49. 4% od ukupne populacije, ili 36. 000 na području Srebrenice. Međutim, zbog ustaških zločina nad Srbima na ovom području i malog prirasta nakon rata (zbog počinjenog genocida nad Srbima) postotak Srba u odnosu na ukupnu populaciju od 80. 000 stanovnika, opao je na 35. 6%, dok se procenat muslimana uvećao na čak 61. 9% u 1991. godini, na osnovu popisa stanovništva koji je sproveden u toj godini.


14. Depressive History of Serbs in Srebrenica:

Srebrenica has a sad history for Serbs particularly during World War II, and their sorrow is reflected in the number of Serbs population in Srebrenica. Before the World War II, Serbs accounted for 50. 6% and Muslims for 49. 4% of the total population, or 36, 000, in Srebrenica area. However, because of the atrocities of German Nazi’s collaborators against Serbs in the area during the war and its resultant low growth of the population afterwards, the ratio of Serbs to the total population, or 80, 000, dropped to 35. 6%, and the ratio of Muslims increased to 61. 9% in 1991, according to the census of the former republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina (BH).




15. Fašistička "SS Handžar Divizija" i Srebrenica
Fašističke sluge u BiH, koja je u to vrijeme pripadala Nezavisnoj državi Hrvatskoj - satelitskoj zemlji Velikog Rajha, su bile poznate i kao ustaška "SS Handžar divizija". Ova vojna formacija je osnovana u februaru 1943. godine po naređenju Hitlera i blagoslovu jerusalemskog muftije, Hitlerovog bliskog saradnika, a u cilju borbe protiv partizana. Uloga "SS Handžar divizije" je bio da uništava Srbe a sastojala se od 20. 000 vojnika, uglavnom muslimana. Oni su primjenjivali nezapamćen teror, djelimično naslijeđen od Turaka. Svakodnevne tehnike mučenja su bila silovanja, vađenja očiju, odsjecanje testisa živim muškarcima... Iživljavanje nad srpskim stanovništvom je bilo toliko svirepo da su ih zbog toga osuđivali i njemački SS oficiri. U toku 2. svjetskog rata "SS Handžar divizija" je kontrolisala područje Srebrenice.


15. Nazi’s “SS Handzar Division” and Srebrenica

Nazi collaborators in BH, which belonged to Independent State of Croatia, or a puppet state of Fascist Germany, were called “SS Handzar Division” of Ustasha. The Division was established in February 1943, by the order of Hitler and with the blessing of Jerusalem Mufti, Hitler’s close associate, in order to fight against Tito’s partisans. The role of “SS Handzar Division” was to eradicate Serbs, and it consisted of 20, 000 soldiers, mainly Muslims(3). The techniques of terror that it used were appallingly cruel, being inherited from Turks in the period of Ottoman Empire(4). According to Florentin Manuel(5), the most usual techniques were raping women, removing eyes and cutting testicles of alive men, and the action of “SS Handzar” was more like an armed band than a military unit(6). It is said that their cruelty was such that even German SS officers accused actions of those people(7). Srebrenica area was under the direct assault of this “SS Handzar Division” during World War II.
Ratko Obrenovic : Detroit, Usa 22546 14.09.2009

Experts Debate the Influence of Islamism During the Bosnian War of 1992 to 1995


By Judith Latham, Washington

The role of the mujahadeen, or holy warriors, in Afghanistan during the 1980’s has become well known in the six years since the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. But some Balkan analysts say that in the 1990’s Bosnia served as a “crucible for the global jihad” led by Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida organization.

John Schindler, a professor of strategy at the Naval War College, is the author of a new book, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qaida, and the Rise of Global Jihad, in which he argues that Bosnia played an identical role in the global jihad as did Afghanistan a decade earlier. Daniel Nelson is the author of six books, including The Balkan Imbroglio. Mr. Nelson, whose association with the former Yugoslavia extends over 35 years, disagrees with Mr. Schindler that radical Islam played a “formative role” in the creation of the Bosnian conflict of 1992 to 1995.

Speaking with host Judith Latham of VOA News Now’s Encounter Program, Mr. Schindler says he wrote his book because information on the link between Bosnia and the global jihad was virtually unknown in the United States. In it he traces the growth of al-Qaida from a “South Asian terror problem” into a global threat, and he says it was in Bosnia that al-Qaida “metastasized into a global jihad organization. ” Mr. Schindler says he holds former Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic as the person most responsible that the Bosnian War of 1992-95 unfolded in the “horrible way that it did. ”

Daniel Nelson, who is also president of Global Concepts and Communications, an international consulting firm in Alexandria, Virginia, and senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation in Washington, says that, although former President Izetbegovic was unquestionably a “savvy politician” who was also corrupt, these characteristics were “even more true” of former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and former Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. To suggest that there was an “organic linkage” between what happened in Bosnia with the events of 9/11, Mr. Nelson insists, is a gross exaggeration.

In the case of the February 1994 marketplace massacre in Sarajevo, in which many Bosnian Muslim civilians lost their lives, Mr. Schindler says that – contrary to television reportage – the Serbs were not the responsible party. He suggests that that it was “probably a Muslim effort to kill their own citizens to gain sympathy, which they did on numerous occasions as part of a broader strategy to induce Western intervention in the war. ” But Daniel Nelson calls that claim “absurd” and “beyond the pale. ”


The Srebrenica massacre was the largest mass murder in Europe since World War II

John Schindler identifies the 1995 Srebrenica massacre of more than 7, 000 Muslim men and boys at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs as the “turning point in the war. ” It was, he says, primarily an act of “revenge, ” which had its origins in “Muslim atrocities against Serbs. ” He furthermore blames the tragedy mainly on the Izetbegovic government in Sarajevo, which he says used it to gain Western intervention. But Daniel Nelson calls Srebrenica “planned mass murder” and an instance of “genocide, ” and he argues furthermore that revenge is “no exoneration for mass murder. ”

Regarding the role of “Islamism” in Bosnia, John Schindler identifies Iran and Saudi Arabia as “influential players” in shaping the political and cultural scene in the 1990’s. Daniel Nelson disagrees that Bosnia is an “Islamicist” state today, and he says that Mr. Schindler “greatly over-exaggerates” the effect of Bosnia as a linchpin for the Islamicist global movement.

John Schindler's claims are extraordinary and reflect a keen debate inside the National Security Agency in the period after 9/11. Both he and Daniel Nelson were privy to classified materials, but came to opposite conclusions.
Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac 16524 02.12.2007

Was Srebrenica a Hoax?(1)

By Carlos Martins Branco, Emperor's Clothes, 4 March 1998

ŠPublisher's note: I have included this document concerning the massacre of Moslem civilians in Srebenica in 1995, not because of the question it raises, but because of the ideological uses to which people have put the issue. ?

It is now two years since the Muslim enclave, Srebrenica, fell into the hands of the Serbian army in Bosnia. Much has been written about the matter. Nonetheless the majority of reports have been limited to a broad media exposure of the event, with very little analytic rigour. Discussion of Srebrenica cannot be limited to genocide and mass graves, which has been almost a banal occurrence throughout ex-Yugoslavia. A rigorous analysis of the events must take into consideration the background circumstances, in order to understand the real motives which led to the fall of the enclave.

The zone of Srebrenica, like almost all of Eastern Bosnia, is characterized by very rugged terrain. Steep valleys with dense forests and deep ravines make it impossible for combat vehicles to pass, and offers a clear advantage to defensive forces. Given the resources available to both parties, and the characteristics of the terrain, it would seem that the Bosnian army (ABiH) had the necessary force to defend itself, if it had used full advantage of the terrain. This, however, did not occur.

Given the military advantage of the ŠMuslim? defensive forces it is very difficult to explain the absence of military resistance. The Muslim forces did not establish an effective defensive system and did not even try to take advantage of their heavy artillery, under control of the United Nations (UN) forces, at a time in which they had every reason to do so.

The lack of ŠMuslim? military response stands in clear contrast to the offensive attitude which characterized the actions of the ŠMuslim? defensive forces in previous siege situations, which typically launched violent raids against the Serbian villages surrounding the enclave, thus producing heavy casualties amongst the Serbian civilian population.

But in this instance, with the attention of the media focused upon the area, military defence of the enclave would have revealed the true situation in security zones, and demonstrated that these had never been genuinely demilitarized zones as was claimed, but harboured highly-armed ŠMuslim? military units. Military resistance would jeopardize the image of ŠMuslims as? victims, which had been so carefully constructed, and which the Muslims considered it was vital to maintain.

Throughout the entire operation it was clear that there were profound disagreements among the leaders of the enclave. From a military viewpoint, there was total confusion. ŠNasir? ORIC, the charismatic commander of Srebrenica, was absent. Š2?

The Sarajevo government did not authorize his return in order to lead the resistance. Military power fell into the hands of his lieutenants, who had a long history of incompatibility. The absence of Oric's clear leadership led to a situation of total ineptitude. The contradictory orders of his successors completely paralysed the forces under siege.

The behaviour of the political leaders is also interesting. The local SDP president, Zlatko Dukic, in an interview with European Union observers, explained that Srebrenica formed part of a business transaction which involved a logistical support route to Sarajevo, via Šthe Sarajevo suburb of? VOGOSCA. He also claimed that the fall of the enclave formed part of an orchestrated campaign to discredit the West and win the support of Islamic countries. This was the reason for ŠNasir? Oric to maintain distance from his troops. This thesis was also defended by the local supporters of the SDA Šthe Party of Democratic Action party of Alija Izetbegovic Š3?. ? There were also many rumours of a trade within the local population of the enclave.

Another curious aspect was the absence of a military reaction from the 2nd Corps of the Muslim army Šoutside of the enclave? , which did nothing to relieve the military pressure on the enclave. It was common knowledge that the ŠBosnian? Serb unit in the region, the Drina Corps, was exhausted and that the attack on Srebrenica was only possible with the aid of units from other regions. Despite this fact, Sarajevo did not lift a finger in order to launch an attack which would have divided the Serbian forces and exposed the vulnerabilities created by the concentration of ŠBosnian Serb? resources around Srebrenica. Such an attack would have reduced the military pressure on the enclave.

It is also important to register the pathetic appeal of the president of Opstina Šwhich means Đu2018county, Đu2019 in Serbo-Croatian? , Osman Suljic, on July 9, Š1995? which implored military observers to say to the world that the Serbians were using chemical weapons. The same gentleman later accused the media of transmitting false news items on the resistance of troops in the enclave, requiring a denial from the UN. According to Suljic, the Muslim troops did not respond, and would never respond with heavy artillery fire. Simultaneously, he complained of the lack of food supplies and of the humanitarian situation. Curiously, Šthe U. N. ? observers were never allowed to inspect the ŠSrebrenica Muslim? food reserve deposits. The emphasis given by political leaders on the lack of military response and the absence of food provisions loosely suggests an official policy which began to be discernible.

ŠNote from TENC: What Branco writes above about chemical weapons is not entirely clear. In a discussion of this text on the T-Watch list, Branco was clearer, stating that one of the crucial questions about Srebrenica was, “Why did they Šthe Muslim leadership inside Srebrenica? pressure us to pass the lie of Serbs attacking with chemical gas? ” For his full list of crucial questions about Srebrenica, see footnote Š4?. ?

In mid 1995, the prolongation of the war had dampened public interest. There had been a substantial reduction in the pressure of public opinion Šagainst the Serbs? in the western democracies. An incident of this importance would nonetheless provide hot news material for the media during several weeks, could awaken public opinion and incite new passions. In this manner it would be possible to kill two birds with one stone: pressure could be laid to bear in order to lift the embargo Ši. e. , the much-ignored international ban on arming the Bosnian Muslim extremists—EC? and simultaneously the occupying countries would find it difficult to withdraw their forces, a Špossiblity? which had been advanced by leading UN figures such as Akashi and Boutros-Boutros Ghali.
Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac 16523 02.12.2007

Was Srebrenica a Hoax?(2)

As early as 1993, at the time of the first crisis of the enclave, ŠPresident of Republika Srpska Dr. Radovan? Karadzic had proposed to Izetbegovic to exchange Srebrenica for the ŠSarajevo? suburb of Vogošća. This exchange included the movement of populations in both directions. This was the purpose of secret negotiations in order to avoid undesirable publicity. This implied that the western countries accepted and encouraged ethnic separation.

The truth is that both the Americans and President Izetbegovic had tacitly agreed that it made no sense to insist in maintaining these isolated enclaves in a divided Bosnia. In 1995 nobody believed any longer in the inevitability of ethnic division of the territory. In the month of June 1995, before the military operation in Srebrenica, Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to President Clinton stated that “America should encourage the Bosnians to think in terms of territories with greater territorial coherence and compactness. ” In other words this meant that the enclaves should be forgotten. The attack on Srebrenica, with no help from Belgrade, was completely unnecessary and proved to be one of the most significant examples of the political failure of the Serbian leadership.

Meanwhile the western media exacerbated the situation by transforming the enclaves into a powerful mass-media icon; a situation which Izetbegovic was quick to exploit. CNN had daily broadcasts of the Šsupposed? images of “mass graves for thousands of corpses, ” Šsupposedly? obtained from spy satellites. Despite the Šsupposed? microscopic precision in the localization of these “graves, ” it is certain that no discovery to date has confirmed such suspicions. Since there are no longer restrictions on ŠNATO troops? movement Šthroughout Bosnia? , we inevitably speculate on why they have still not been shown to the world.

ŠNote from EC: Mr. Branco is using irony to convey his belief that the supposed mass graves do not exist. However, given the effect of media repetition of the supposed massacre story, irony is easily missed; hence our repeated insert of “supposed. ”?

If there had been a premeditated ŠSerbian? plan of genocide, instead of attacking in only one direction, from the south to the north—which left the possibility of escape to the north and west, the Serbs would have established a siege in order to ensure that no one escaped. The UN observation posts to the north of the enclave were never disturbed and remained in activity after the cessation of military operations. There are obviously mass graves in the outskirts of Srebrenica as in the rest of ex-Yugoslavia where combat has occurred, but there are no grounds for the campaign which was mounted, nor the numbers advanced by CNN. ŠLarge graves are often dug after a battle in order to dispose of bodies as part of battlefield clean-up. —EC?

The mass graves are filled by a limited number of corpses from both sides, the consequence of heated battle and combat and not the result of a premeditated plan of genocide, as occurred against the Serbian populations in Krajina, Š7? in the Summer of 1995, when the Croatian army implemented the mass murder of all Serbians found there. In this instance, Šin the instance of the fall of Krajina? the media maintained an absolute silence, despite the fact that the genocide occurred over a three month period. The objective of Srebrenica was ethnic cleansing and not genocide, unlike what happened in Krajina, in which although there was no military resistance, the Croatian army decimated villages.

Despite knowledge of the fact that the enclaves were already a lost cause, Sarajevo insisted in drawing political dividends from the fact. The receptivity which had been created in the eyes of public opinion made it easier to sell the thesis of genocide.

But of even greater importance than the genocide thesis and the political isolation of the Serbs, was blackmailing of the UN: either the UN joined forces with the Sarajevo government in the conflict (which subsequently happened) or the UN would be completely discredited in the eyes of the public, leading in turn to support for Bosnia Ši. e. , Bosnian Muslim extremists?. Srebrenica was the last straw which led western governments to reach agreement on the need to cease their “neutrality” and commence Šan open? military action against one side in the conflict Ši. e. , the Bosnian Serbs?. It was the last straw which united the West in their desire to break “Serbian bestiality”. Sarajevo Šthe Muslim extremistĐu2019s so-called ‘government’? was conscious of the fact that it lacked the military capacity to defeat the ŠBosnian? Serbs. It was necessary to create conditions via which the international community Ši. e. the West? could do this for them. Srebrenica played a vital role in this process.

Srebrenica represents one of a series of acts by the Serbian leaders intended to provoke the UN, in order to demonstrate their impotence. This was a serious strategic error which would cost them dear. The side which had everything to win by demonstrating the impotence of the UN was the Sarajevo leadership and not that of Pale Šcapital of Republika Srpska?. In 1995 it was clear that the change in the status quo required a powerful intervention which would overthrow the Serbian military power. Srebrenica was one of the pretexts, resulting from the short-sightedness of the Bosnian Serbian leaders.

The besieged ŠMuslim? forces could have easily defended the enclave, at least for much longer, if they had been well led. It proved convenient to let the enclave fall in this manner. Since the enclave was doomed to fall, it was preferable to let this happen in the most beneficial manner possible. But this would only have been viable if Sarajevo had political initiative and freedom of movement, which would never occur at the negotiating table. The deliberate fall of the enclave might appear to be an act of terrible Machiavellian orchestration, Šobviously designed in the minds of the Bosnian Muslims' US advisers—EC? but the truth is that the Sarajevo government had much to gain, as proved to be the case. Srebrenica was not a zero-sum game. The Serbians won a military victory but with highly negative political side-effects, which helped result in their definitive ostracization.

We might add a final curious note. As the UN observation posts were attacked, and proved impossible to maintain, the ŠUN? forces withdrew. The barricades set up by the Muslim army did not let the troops pass. These ŠUN? troops were not treated as soldiers fleeing from the front line, but rather with a sordid differentiation.

The Muslims not only refused to fight to defend themselves, they forced others Ši. e. , the Dutch/UN force? to fight on their behalf. In one instance, the commander of a Dutch vehicle decided after conversations with ABiH ŠBosnian Muslim force? to pass Štheir? barrier. ŠDutch positions were in front of the Muslim positions—i. e. between the Muslims forces and the attacking Serbs. ? A Muslim soldier threw a hand grenade whose fragments mortally wounded him. The only UN soldier to die in the Srebrenica offensive was killed by the Muslims.
Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac 16522 02.12.2007

Was Srebrenica a Hoax?(3)

The Muslims always harboured a secret hope that the embargo would be Šofficially? lifted. This had become the prime objective of the Sarajevo ŠMuslim? government, and had been fueled by the vote in the US Senate and Congress in favour of such a measure. President Clinton, however, vetoed the decision and required a two thirds majority in both houses. The enclaves collapse gave the decisive push that the campaign needed. After its fall, the US Senate voted with over a two thirds majority in favour of lifting the embargo. Š5?

It was the clear that sooner or later the enclaves would fall into the hands of the Serbians, it was an inevitability. There was a consensus amongst the negotiators (the US administration, the UN and European governments) that it was impossible to maintain the three Muslim enclaves, Š6? and that they should be exchanged for territories in Central Bosnia. Madeleine Albright suggested this exchange on numerous occasions to Izetbegovic, based on the proposals of the contact group.

As early as 1993, at the time of the first crisis of the enclave, ŠPresident of Republika Srpska Dr. Radovan? Karadzic had proposed to Izetbegovic to exchange Srebrenica for the ŠSarajevo? suburb of Vogošća. This exchange included the movement of populations in both directions. This was the purpose of secret negotiations in order to avoid undesirable publicity. This implied that the western countries accepted and encouraged ethnic separation.

The truth is that both the Americans and President Izetbegovic had tacitly agreed that it made no sense to insist in maintaining these isolated enclaves in a divided Bosnia. In 1995 nobody believed any longer in the inevitability of ethnic division of the territory. In the month of June 1995, before the military operation in Srebrenica, Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to President Clinton stated that “America should encourage the Bosnians to think in terms of territories with greater territorial coherence and compactness. ” In other words this meant that the enclaves should be forgotten. The attack on Srebrenica, with no help from Belgrade, was completely unnecessary and proved to be one of the most significant examples of the political failure of the Serbian leadership.

Meanwhile the western media exacerbated the situation by transforming the enclaves into a powerful mass-media icon; a situation which Izetbegovic was quick to exploit. CNN had daily broadcasts of the Šsupposed? images of “mass graves for thousands of corpses, ” Šsupposedly? obtained from spy satellites. Despite the Šsupposed? microscopic precision in the localization of these “graves, ” it is certain that no discovery to date has confirmed such suspicions. Since there are no longer restrictions on ŠNATO troops? movement Šthroughout Bosnia? , we inevitably speculate on why they have still not been shown to the world.

ŠNote from EC: Mr. Branco is using irony to convey his belief that the supposed mass graves do not exist. However, given the effect of media repetition of the supposed massacre story, irony is easily missed; hence our repeated insert of “supposed. ”?

If there had been a premeditated ŠSerbian? plan of genocide, instead of attacking in only one direction, from the south to the north - which left the possibility of escape to the north and west, the Serbs would have established a siege in order to ensure that no one escaped. The UN observation posts to the north of the enclave were never disturbed and remained in activity after the cessation of military operations. There are obviously mass graves in the outskirts of Srebrenica as in the rest of ex-Yugoslavia where combat has occurred, but there are no grounds for the campaign which was mounted, nor the numbers advanced by CNN. ŠLarge graves are often dug after a battle in order to dispose of bodies as part of battlefield clean-up. —EC?

The mass graves are filled by a limited number of corpses from both sides, the consequence of heated battle and combat and not the result of a premeditated plan of genocide, as occurred against the Serbian populations in Krajina, Š7? in the Summer of 1995, when the Croatian army implemented the mass murder of all Serbians found there. In this instance, Šin the instance of the fall of Krajina? the media maintained an absolute silence, despite the fact that the genocide occurred over a three month period. The objective of Srebrenica was ethnic cleansing and not genocide, unlike what happened in Krajina, in which although there was no military resistance, the Croatian army decimated villages. Despite knowledge of the fact that the enclaves were already a lost cause, Sarajevo insisted in drawing political dividends from the fact. The receptivity which had been created in the eyes of public opinion made it easier to sell the thesis of genocide.

But of even greater importance than the genocide thesis and the political isolation of the Serbs, was blackmailing of the UN: either the UN joined forces with the Sarajevo government in the conflict (which subsequently happened) or the UN would be completely discredited in the eyes of the public, leading in turn to support for Bosnia Ši. e. , Bosnian Muslim extremists?. Srebrenica was the last straw which led western governments to reach agreement on the need to cease their “neutrality” and commence Šan open? military action against one side in the conflict Ši. e. , the Bosnian Serbs?. It was the last straw which united the West in their desire to break “Serbian bestiality”. Sarajevo Šthe Muslim extremist's so-called ’government’? was conscious of the fact that it lacked the military capacity to defeat the ŠBosnian? Serbs. It was necessary to create conditions via which the international community Ši. e. the West? could do this for them. Srebrenica played a vital role in this process.

Srebrenica represents one of a series of acts by the Serbian leaders intended to provoke the UN, in order to demonstrate their impotence. This was a serious strategic error which would cost them dear. The side which had everything to win by demonstrating the impotence of the UN was the Sarajevo leadership and not that of Pale Šcapital of Republika Srpska?. In 1995 it was clear that the change in the status quo required a powerful intervention which would overthrow the Serbian military power. Srebrenica was one of the pretexts, resulting from the short-sightedness of the Bosnian Serbian leaders.

The besieged ŠMuslim? forces could have easily defended the enclave, at least for much longer, if they had been well led. It proved convenient to let the enclave fall in this manner. Since the enclave was doomed to fall, it was preferable to let this happen in the most beneficial manner possible. But this would only have been viable if Sarajevo had political initiative and freedom of movement, which would never occur at the negotiating table. The deliberate fall of the enclave might appear to be an act of terrible Machiavellian orchestration, Šobviously designed in the minds of the Bosnian Muslims' US advisers—EC? but the truth is that the Sarajevo government had much to gain, as proved to be the case. Srebrenica was not a zero-sum game. The Serbians won a military victory but with highly negative political side-effects, which helped result in their definitive ostracization.

We might add a final curious note. As the UN observation posts were attacked, and proved impossible to maintain, the ŠUN? forces withdrew. The barricades set up by the Muslim army did not let the troops pass. These ŠUN? troops were not treated as soldiers fleeing from the front line, but rather with a sordid differentiation.
Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac 16521 02.12.2007

Was Srebrenica a Hoax?(4)

The Muslims not only refused to fight to defend themselves, they forced others Ši. e. , the Dutch/UN force? to fight on their behalf. In one instance, the commander of a Dutch vehicle decided after conversations with ABiH ŠBosnian Muslim force? to pass Štheir? barrier. ŠDutch positions were in front of the Muslim positions - i. e. between the Muslims forces and the attacking Serbs. ? A Muslim soldier threw a hand grenade whose fragments mortally wounded him. The only UN soldier to die in the Srebrenica offensive was killed by the Muslims.

Carlos Martins Branco
European University Institute
Department of Social and Political Sciences
Badia Fiesolana
Italy
Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac 2613 14.11.2005

The Story Behind Srebrenica (1)

by Željko Tomic
the article can be copied with reference to http://www.slavicnet.com/ and the author's name

Srebrenica. A small town in Eastern Bosnia, hardly known even for the local citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the Civil war broke in Bosnia during 1992. A few years later, Srebrenica became a “rhetorical device used to arouse emotions and moral outrage” in entire world. According to the media, between 8000 and 10000 individuals (mostly Bosnian men) have vanished for nine days of July 2005.

A small city, which countered 5754 citizens ( 3683 Muslims, 1649 Serbian and 432 others), turned to be the place of a "single largest act of genocide in Europe since the Holocaust? " According to the 1991 census, entire Srebrenica municipality had 37. 211 citizens (27118 Muslim Bosniaks, 9381 Serbian, and 712 others). Since only a half of Muslim Bosniaks were men, according to the media up to 10. 000 men, out of 13. 500 males living in that region, died between July 10 and 15th, 1995. How it was possible?

Soon after the Civil war started in Bosnia, Srebrenica municipality became surrounded by Serbian troops. Since a large territory around Srebrenica had Serbian population as majority, Srebrenica became a small enclave within a new-born Republic of Srpska.

In early 1993 Gen. Morillon entered Srebrenica and told their citizens that they were under protection of UN.

In the years that followed, UN failed to disarm the Muslim soldiers in Srebrenica. On the contrary, the Clinton administration and NATO lifted the arms embargo against Bosnia. The ammunition and firearms were supplied to the protective zone in Srebrenica by the air, but also by Dutch peacekeepers over the Serbian territory.

At the same time, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, was crying for help. He needed to open another frontline against Bosnian Serbs because his army was loosing on most battlefields. His "new" general, former police officer, Naser Oric, raided 56 Serbian villages. He used the safety zone as a protective Haven in order to massacre the Serbian people in surrounding villages. Serbian Army, stretched above the limits, had 3000 soldiers to protect 420 kilometers of frontline around Srebrenica. As a result of that, many Serb villages were burned and destroyed, e. g. Osredak May 1992, Oparke June 01, 1992, Zagora July 05, 1992, Zalezje July 12, 1992 Pajici and Hrahna July 25, 1992, Brezani July 30, 1992, Fakovici October 1992, Kravice January 07, 1993 (Christmas Day for the Orthodox Bosnian Serbs).

As a result of 3, 5 years war against 28th division from Srebrenica, Serbian surrounding population lost about 2000 individuals.

A couple weeks before Srebrenica fall under Serbian control, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, transferred Naser Oric and 40 his main commanders to Zenica. The official explanation for that was that they were suppose to perform some military training. However, Srebrenica was, probably, part of the deal with Radovan Karadzic. The Serbs were suppose to withdraw their troops from Sarajevo, in return they would take control over Srebrenica. The Muslim population of Srebrenica was thrown in front of the revenge thirsty Serbs.

It will take eight years after the war for The International War Tribunal to indite Muslim General Naser Oric "for the crimes of wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages not justified by military necessity and plunder of property as alleged in this indictment".

MudzahedinI am not here to justify what angry Serbs did when they entered Srebrenica, but I can understand why the local Serbs killed between 700 and 900, mostly Muslim men, in Srebrenica. Some of their relatives were beheaded by the Muslim Bosnian Army, like those three Serbs on the picture.

Yes, I said up to 900 people, but not 10. 000 as the Bosnian government claims.


Please, read the next page
Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac 2611 14.11.2005

The Story Behind Srebrenica (2)

Please, read the previous page

The Serbian government of Republic of Srpska, one of two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, formed a team of experts who came up with a list of 7108 «missing» individuals from Srebrenica. However, the list has many problems:

  • The list is compiled from several different sources, supplied by different organizations. As a result of that, the same names sometimes repeat several times, since different family relatives of friends reported missing people. Very often the supplied information is incomplete, or showing different dates and places for the same individual.

  • The list was based on unreliable sources. Some of them were created on the Internet. Anybody in the world could report a missing person, so the sources who supplied information can not be verified.

  • Many Muslim individuals deserted from the Bosnian army, and moved to some European countries, or to the Bosnian Muslim controlled territories. Bosnian government has no interest to verify the real number of missing individuals. The truth could be too painful!

  • At least 2000 Muslim soldiers were killed prior to the "Srebrenica massacre", in 3, 5 years fighting with the army of General Ratko Mladic. At least 50% of them were killed trying to cross the Serbian controlled territory, between cities of Han Pijesak, Sekovici and Zvornik. Most of killed Bosnian soldiers were involved in arms or tobacco smuggling operations, on the route between cities of Tuzla and Srebrenica.

  • Many Muslims, who died from the natural causes during almost four years long war, ended on the list of "missing" people from Srebrenica.

  • Some Bosnian army soldiers, who were born in Srebrenica but lived and died in Sarajevo or Tuzla, were identified as a victims of the Srebrenica "massacre", so they were brought and berried with honors in Srebrenica after the war.

  • Only 1700 bodies were found, many of them were not identified yet. Some of them could be missing Serbs killed by the Bosnian mujahedins.

    The "Srebrenica massacre" was just another master-piece of the Muslim led government of Alija Izetbegovic. The scenario for the betrayal of Srebrenica was consciously prepared, to blame the Serbian people, who won the war. The Hollywood-like scenario of "Srebrenica massacre" might be a trap for General Ratko Mladic to be indited for war crimes. Alija Izetbegovic didn't care about suffering of his own people, death of destruction. For this Islamic fanatic, the only goal was to create an Islamic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    A recent news report revealed that should it proceed at the current pace, the identification of Srebrenica victims would take 45 more years. In mean time, the entire Serbian population is being blamed (and punished) for thousands of un-existing victims of the "Srebrenica massacre". It has been more than ten years since the Civil war in Bosnia ended. In order to start looking forward into a new future, we need to realize that both, Serbian and Muslim people, were victims of the wrongful nationalist / American politics on Balkans. Some things have to be set right!
  • Zeljko Tomic : Sokolac 2486 20.10.2005

    There are three turning points in the civil war in Bosnia that have been used to subdue, destroy and then cleanse the Serbian People from their ancestral lands. In all of the three cases the same method was used:

    MASS MURDER FOR THE CAMERA


    In all three cases an excuse was needed to escalate the war against the rights of the Serbian people to decide where and with whom they want to live. All three events were alike, and for all of them Serbs were to take the blame. The suspicion about what really happened is based on the following facts:

  • In neither of the three events Serbian experts were allowed to participate in the ballistic expertise.
  • Neither of the Western expertise proved that Serbs were responsible for the massacre.
  • For all three events media (and the first aid) happened to be at the spot.
  • Each event had substantial political and military consequences for the Serbian side in the conflict.


    Here are the events and their significance:


    1) May 27, 1992 - bread line incident.
    An announced special UN session was to convene on 31 of May 1992 to discuss possible imposition of sanctions on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Four days before the event (on the 27th of May) the massacre took place in Sarajevo. The American administration used the event to push the sanctions through the UN Security Council.


    2) Feb 5, 1994 - Markale Market slaughter (Part I)
    By early 1994, it was clear that Islam Fundamentalists can not win the war and that they needed help. At the same time NATO was searching for its raison d'etre. The incident helped both. It was used as an excuse to substitute UN troops with NATO ones. It was also used to set a trip wire for future NATO involvement.


    3) Avg 28, 1995 - Markale Market (Part II)
    U. S. Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Holbrooke announced the need for a pretext for NATO carpet bombing. Islam fundamentalist delivered in less than 24 hours. Day after, despite the evidence (coming from Russian, French and British independent teams of observers on the ground) that Muslims staged yet another slaughter for the camera - American administration insists that Serbs are the culprits. The largest bombing in the history of NATO alliance started day later. NATO bombed Christian Serbs out of their ancestral homes - in order to establish Islam Fundamentalist stronghold in the heart of Europe.

    The original article can be found on http://www.srpska-mreza.com/

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